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This paper presents an elementary introduction to Consistent Quantum Theory (CQT), as de-
veloped by Griffiths and others over the past 25 years. The theory is a version of orthodox
(Copenhagen) quantum mechanics, based on the notion that the unique and mysterious feature of
quantum, as opposed to classical, systems is the simultaneous existence of multiple incompatible
representations of reality, referred to as “frameworks”. A framework is a maximal set of prop-
erties of a system for which probabilities can be consistently defined. This notion is expressed
by saying that a framework provides an exhaustive set of exclusive alternatives (ESEA), but no
single framework suffices to fully characterize a quantum system. Any prediction of the theory
must be confined to a single framework and combining elements from different frameworks leads to
quantum mechanically meaningless statements. This “single framework rule” is the precise math-
ematical statement of Bohr’s complementarity. It is shown that if the microscopic description is
assumed to incorporate these elements in a local setting, then distant entanglements, macroscopic
measurements, wave function collapse and other mysterious features of quantum behavior follow
in a logical manner. The essential elements of the theory are first explained using the simplest
quantum system, a single spin-½ degree of freedom at one time.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
The present author considers Consistent Quantum
Theory (Griffiths, 2002) (hereafter CQT) to be the clear-
est and most correct formulation of non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics. The theory was introduced over 25 years
ago by Robert Griffiths (Griffiths, 1984) and further elab-
orated by Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993)(see also (Hartle,
2007, 2008)) and by Omnes (1999), but it appears to be
little known outside of a rather narrow circle of specialists
in foundations of quantum mechanics. Even within that
community, however, CQT is mostly the object of rather
cursory judgments and comments, rather than penetrat-
ing analysis and/or criticism. The theory is meant to be
a version of orthodox quantum mechanics, formulated in
such a way as to remove as much of the obscurity and
mystery as possible (but no more!) and to state precisely
what is assumed and what is derived. In the words of its
inventor CQT is “Copenhagen done right!”
This paper is an attempt to familiarize a broader com-
munity of students, teachers and researchers with the
theory, in the hopes that they will find it as appealing
as does the present author. The only original element
that can be claimed for this presentation is the con-
tention that the essence of quantum mechanics, including
all its “weirdness and mystery”, must be confronted and
can be explained by studying the simplest example of
a quantum mechanical system, a single spin-½ degree of
freedom at one time. This is so because this system al-
ready displays the fundamental uniqueness of quantum
mechanics, namely complementarity. Thus, questions of
measurement, entanglement, nonlocality, collapse of the
wave function and the myriad quantum paradoxes that
have plagued the “interpretation” of the theory for over
80 years become add-ons that are relatively easily in-
corporated, once one has faced the fundamental issue
of complementarity which already arises for the simplest
system.
Our formulation of quantum mechanics is based on the
following assumptions:
A. Physical objects and their properties
are represented by states in an appropriate
(Hilbert) space.
B. The predictions of quantum mechanics are
not deterministic but intrinsically probabilis-
tic. They can (and should) be expressed as
the probability that the system under study
will possess a specific property at a given
time, with suitable generalization for multi-
ple times. This is so even though quantum
mechanical states evolve according to the de-
terministic Schroedinger equation, since the
wave function yields probabilistic information
about physical systems.
C. The principle of unicity does not hold:
there is not a unique exhaustive description
of a physical system or process. Instead re-
ality is such that it can be described in var-
ious alternative incompatible ways using de-
scriptions, called “frameworks”, which can-
not be compared or combined. This is the
principle of complementarity or incompatibil-
ity, expressed in terms of the “single frame-
work rule”, to be elucidated in what follows.
As explained below, CQT takes a realistic point of
view, in that it deals with real (i.e. intrinsic) properties
2of physical systems, independent of observers or mea-
surement. The essential feature of the theory is that its
“quantum realism” posits multiple incompatible but co-
existing layers of reality, expressed in the theory as differ-
ent “frameworks”. Any quantum mechanical statement
must refer to one and only one framework (the “single
framework rule”). This basic assumption is consistent
with Bohr’s complementarity principle, but it is formu-
lated without recourse to measurement or to the exis-
tence of a classical regime and it is therefore more gen-
eral and can be more precisely formulated than Bohr’s
complementarity principle.
The above, of course, assumes that quantum mechan-
ics is an exact theory in the non-relativistic domain.
Various authors have explored the possibility of physical
corrections to quantum mechanics, which would in par-
ticular bring about collapse of the wave function when
macroscopic measurements are made (see for example
Adler and Bassi (2009) and references therein), but we
shall not consider this alternative in the present discus-
sion.
II. A SPIN-½ PARTICLE
The classical representation of a spin of magnitude ½
can be taken as a vector in 3-space with magnitude ½,
i.e. a point on the surface of a sphere of radius ½. The
direction w, for example, leads to the spin
Sw = [Sxx+ Syy + Szz], (1)
where
S2x + S
2
y + S
2
z = 1/4, (2)
and x,y, z are unit vectors forming a basis in 3-space.
Classical mechanics describes the motion (orbit) of this
point on the surface of the sphere and a measurement, if
carried out appropriately, would verify the predictions of
that theory. A feature of the states in Eq.(1) is that for
S in the z-direction, for example, we have
Sz = ½, Sx = 0, Sy = 0, (3)
i.e. the information regarding Sx, Sy and Sz is consistent
and mutually compatible. A general state can have any
value of Sx, Sy and Sz satisfying the constraint (2).
Quantum mechanically, the system is represented by
states, also indexed by a directionw in 3-space, but these
states exist in a discrete two-dimensional Hilbert space.
Any direction w defines a basis |w+〉, |w−〉, such that any
state of the system, corresponding to the direction v, say,
may be written
|v〉 = |v+〉 = α(v,w)|w+〉+ β(v,w)|w−〉, (4)
with
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1. (5)
The space of states possesses an inner product accord-
ing to which the basis vectors satisfy the orthonormality
conditions
〈w+|w+〉 = 〈w−|w−〉 = 1, (6a)
〈w+|w−〉 = 〈w−|w+〉 = 0. (6b)
The spin in direction w, say, is an observable represented
by an operator Sw with the property
Sw|w+〉 = ½|w+〉, Sw|w−〉 = −½|w−〉, (7)
which is expressed by saying that |w+〉 and |w−〉, are
eigenstates of Sw with eigenvalues ±½ . The expecta-
tion value, or average value, 〈Sw〉 of Sw in an arbitrary
state |v〉 is given by 〈Sw〉 = 〈v|Sw |v〉, so it is ±½ in the
states |w±〉, respectively. This is quite different from the
classical case described in Eqs.(1-2).
The basic assumption B stated in the Introduction is
embodied in the Born Rule, which specifies that the prob-
ability that the operator Sw has the value ½ in the state
|v〉 is given by
Prob(Sw = ½) = |〈w+|v〉|2 = |α|2, (8)
where Eq.(4) has been used.Correspondingly the proba-
bility of the value -½ is |β|2 and by Eq.(5) those are the
only possibilities for Sw, since the probabilities add up
to unity. In accordance with assumption B, probability
is an intrinsic concept in the theory and not reducible to
other notions.
Let us specify v = z and w = x or y. Then the commu-
tation relations between spin components Sx, Sy and Sz
are realized by
|z+〉 = (1/
√
2)(|x+〉+ |x−〉) = (1/
√
2)(|y+〉 − |y−〉),(9a)
|z−〉 = (1/
√
2)(|x+〉 − |x−〉) = (1/
√
2)(|y+〉+ |y−〉),(9b)
If the system is in the state |z+〉, then the following is
true:
Prob(Sz = ½) = 1, Prob(Sz = −½) = 0, (10a)
Prob(Sx = ½) = ½, Prob(Sx = −½) = ½, (10b)
Prob(Sy = ½) = ½, Prob(Sy = −½) = ½. (10c)
Note also that in contrast to Eq.(2), we have 〈S2〉 = 3/4
for spin-½ in the quantum case.
III. THE ORTHODOX FORMULATION OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS
According to the orthodox formulation of quantum me-
chanics (see, for example Landau and Lifshits (1958)), a
system is “represented” by its wave function or state vec-
tors which we denote by |v〉, say. The physical meaning of
this state vector only becomes apparent when one makes
a measurement, for example of Sw. Then the state of
the system “collapses” to one of the eigenstates |w±〉 of
3Sw, with probability given by the Born rule, and the re-
sult of the measurement is the corresponding eigenvalue.
Thus, for example, if the state of the system is |z+〉 and
I measure Sx, then the system goes to states |x±〉 with
eigenvalues±½, respectively, each with probability ½. The
orthodox formulation has been criticized by many au-
thors (see e.g. Bell (1990); Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993);
Griffiths (2002); Omnes (1999)) because the dynami-
cal mechanism for the collapse remains undefined, and
because of the heavy reliance on macroscopic measure-
ments and on the classical domain in defining the physi-
cal meaning of the theory.
IV. COMPLEMENTARITY
An important distinction between the classical and
quantum formulations described above lies in the ques-
tion of compatibility between the values of Sx, Sy and Sz.
In the classical case the three statements in Eq.(3), for
example, are all compatible, whereas the corresponding
quantum mechanical statements in Eqs.(10) cannot be
combined into a single probabilistic formulation involving
all three components of S. The reason is that each line
of Eq.(10) refers to a different sample space and in con-
trast to classical mechanics these sample spaces cannot
be consistently enlarged (“refined”), when the operators
involved do not commute (see below).
The above is an aspect of complementarity, which is
the essence of quantum mechanics and it is a good idea
to incorporate such a fundamental feature in the very for-
mulation of the theory, rather than as an after-thought
once one has gotten into trouble. Complementarity is at
the heart of the Heisenberg Uncertainty (or better, Inde-
terminacy) Principle, according to which two observables
represented by non-commuting operators (e.g. Sx and
Sy) not only cannot be measured simultaneously with ar-
bitrary precision, they cannot be defined simultaneously
with arbitrary precision. Note that we shall often use the
term “complementary” to refer to the incompatibility of
any two noncommuting variables, not just to variables
such as x and p that are maximally incompatible.
V. CONSISTENT QUANTUM THEORY (CQT)
How does one incorporate complementarity into the
theory early on? A clue comes from the existence in the
Hilbert space of an infinity of bases, each one of which
can be used to represent any state of the system. For the
simple case of a spin-½ system we define a “framework”
as any basis in which we choose to represent a given state
of the system. [This definition will be generalized in Sec.
VIII below]. Since according to Eq.(4) an arbitrary quan-
tum state |v〉 can be expanded in an infinite number
of ways by choosing an appropriate basis |w±〉, we see
that the different frameworks are merely different ways
of representing an arbitrary state in the Hilbert space of
spin-½. The characteristics of a framework in this simple
case result from those of the basis, namely (i) that any
state can be represented and (ii) the disjoint possibilities
associated with that framework (spin up or spin down)
have probabilities adding up to unity (certainty). Thus
a framework provides an Exhaustive Set of Exclusive Al-
ternatives (ESEA). It is exhaustive because of (i) and
(ii), and exclusive because the basis vectors are mutually
orthogonal. Note that although there are an infinite num-
ber of different frameworks in which to represent a given
state, since each one is exhaustive any quantum mechan-
ical statement only makes sense (and thus can only be
correct) relative to a particular framework. To illustrate
the last statement let us associate with the state |x+〉
the “property” [x+] which for the present discussion we
define to be the projection operator onto the state |x+〉.
Then the properties [x+] and [x−] represent Boolean al-
ternatives and we can apply the ordinary rules of logic
to these operators. This logic refers to the x-framework.
Alternatively, we can expand the state in question in the
y-basis and employ the y-framework, but it is impossi-
ble to define a framework that combines the properties
[x+] and [y+] in a consistent manner, since the projec-
tion operators do not commute. Indeed, any attempt
to define the disjunction of properties [x+] ∨ [y+] (ei-
ther Sx = ½ or Sy = ½) or the conjunction [x
+] ∧ [y+]
(Sx = ½ and Sy = ½) will fail, since there is no (x,y)-
framework or (x,y) basis in the Hilbert space. In CQT
the essential feature of quantum mechanics, indeed the
full mystery and weirdness of the theory, is captured by
the existence of multiple frameworks, each one of which
provides an account of quantum mechanical “truth”, but
different frameworks are mutually incompatible. A quan-
tum mechanical statement is only meaningful relative to
a particular framework and it is meaningless (quantum
mechanical nonsense) relative to a different framework.
Thus asking “what is the probability that the system has
the property [x+]?” has no meaning in the y-framework.
It is, however a perfectly meaningful question in the x-
framework. Indeed, for a system prepared in the state
|z+〉 I may make the (x-framework) statement Prob([x+])
= ½ and the (y-framework) statement Prob([y+]) = ½, but
as noted above, I cannot give meaning to the probability
of “[x+] or [y+]”. Similarly, for a spin prepared in the
state |z+〉, the statements in Eq. (10) “the system has
the property [z+] with probability 1” and “the system
has the property [x+] with probability ½” are not contra-
dictory but complementary, since they refer to different
frameworks. This means that contrary to the classical
case there exists no overall framework of which each line
in (10) would be a component.
In concluding this section let us note that although
each framework is associated with one and only one ba-
sis in the Hilbert space, a framework and a basis are
not identical. Indeed, since the full wave function can
be expanded in any basis the different bases are in some
sense equivalent. A framework, on the other hand, iden-
tifies the properties (eigenstates) associated with the cor-
4responding basis, but only retains the real probability for
those properties and discards the remaining information.
Thus different frameworks capture different real aspects
of a quantum system and a full description of that system
requires the set of all frameworks.
VI. MEASUREMENTS
As is well known any component of spin can be
measured using a suitable Stern-Gerlach apparatus (see
Griffiths (2002) or Landau and Lifshits (1958)). Notice,
however, that the preceding discussion of CQT made no
reference to measurements. This is because from the
point of view of CQT measurements play no special role,
just as in classical mechanics. This means that since mea-
surements are just one type of physical interaction they
must also be understood and interpreted within an ap-
propriate framework. Although a proper description of
such physical interactions requires the more general for-
malism of Sec.VIII below, since the system must now in-
clude a measurement apparatus, we can anticipate that a
measurement of Sx, for example, needs to be interpreted
in the x-framework. It will not be informative if analyzed
in the z-framework.
As noted above, a measurement of Sx is a physical
process which causes its different eigenstates to be corre-
lated with states of a macroscopic measurement appara-
tus. These correlations are not problematic when viewed
in the appropriate framework. Rather than to say
“given that the system has been prepared in
the state |z+〉, I now make a measurement of
Sx, which collapses the state |z+〉 to |x+〉 or
|x−〉, each with probability ½”,
CQT says
“in the x-framework any state has two dis-
joint possibilities or properties [x+] and [x−],
so for a system prepared in the state |z+〉 a
measurement of Sx, when viewed in the x-
framework, will reveal one or the other of
these properties, each with probability ½. In
the z-framework, on the other hand, I am un-
able to interpret an Sx measurement”.
These issues will be taken up again in Sec. IX, below,
once the more general formulation of CQT has been pre-
sented.
VII. EINSTEIN, BOHR AND BELL
The Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (EPR) (Einstein et al.,
1935) argument starts from two basic assumptions:
EPR1: a (classical) reality criterion accord-
ing to which a physical quantity is real if its
value can be predicted with certainty without
in any way disturbing the system; and
EPR2: a criterion of separability (or local-
ity), which was articulated more clearly in
subsequent presentations of the argument by
Einstein (Born and Einstein, 1971; Einstein,
1954, 1969), according to which “the real fac-
tual situation of system SB is independent of
what is done with system SA if the latter is
spatially separated from the former”.
With these two assumptions EPR showed that the quan-
tum mechanical wave function does not provide a com-
plete description of physical reality.
CQT modifies EPR1 by replacing this “classical real-
ism” assumption by “quantum realism”, whereby phys-
ical properties of a system are real relative to a well-
defined framework, but properties belonging to incom-
patible frameworks are not simultaneously real. As rec-
ognized by the authors themselves, the EPR conclusion
then does not follow. To quote them “... one would not
arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that two or more
physical quantities can be regarded as simultaneous el-
ements of reality only when they can be simultaneously
measured or predicted” (italics in the original). Whether
one follows EPR or CQT in defining “physical reality”,
the issue in contention concerns the simultaneous reality
of quantities pertaining to the same subsystem (i.e. SAx
and SAz , both of which refer to the spin S
A), as opposed
to correlations or “entanglements” between quantities re-
ferring to distant spins SA and SB. Note also that Bohr’s
response to EPR (Bohr, 1935, 1937; Einstein, 1969) in-
volved objections to EPR1, phrased in terms of incom-
patible measurements, and not any denial of EPR2.
In a sense the main criticism leveled by Einstein, in
EPR and elsewhere, against orthodox quantum mechan-
ics concerned the notion of collapse of the wave function
brought about by a measurement. In the orthodox for-
mulation such a collapse occurs even if the physical action
is carried out arbitrarily far from the system being mea-
sured. It is the effects associated with collapse, e.g. that
SAz comes into existence or ceases to exist through a mea-
surement carried out on the arbitrarily distant spin SB,
that Einstein termed “spooky action at a distance”, not
the correlations that allow one to determine the value
of SAz by making a measurement of S
B
z . Such distant
correlations (within a given framework) occur classically
as well as quantum mechanically. According to CQT it
is only the mixing of correlations in different quantum
frameworks that produces puzzling or incorrect results.
Classical entanglement was described by John Bell us-
ing the example of his colleague Dr. Bertlmann (see p.
139 of Bell (2004)), who always wore socks of different
colors. Thus if I see a black sock on Dr. Bertlmann’s
right foot I know for sure that there is a white sock on
his left foot, without having to look. Such entanglements
also operate between classical particles, in that I can de-
termine the spin of particle A by measuring the spin of
particle B, no matter how far away, provided the two
particles were in a state of zero angular momentum at
some earlier time and they drifted away without further
5interactions. An example of distant classical correlations
(although not classical entanglements) is the statement
that if my daughter has a baby in Sydney, Australia, I
instantaneously become a grandfather in NY!
Turning to quantum mechanics, within a given frame-
work entanglement also operates classically. What is spe-
cial about two quantum mechanically entangled parti-
cles is that the correlation is effective in each and ev-
ery framework, but different correlations that cannot be
incorporated into a single framework are not simultane-
ously meaningful.
As is well known it was Bell (1964) who showed that
the two EPR assumptions not only lead to a puzzling re-
sult, but in fact they contradict the quantitative statis-
tical predictions of quantum mechanics. Indeed, starting
from the two EPR assumptions, Bell was able to derive
what is known as the Bell inequality, which is violated
by quantum correlations. If one believes quantum me-
chanics, one is thus forced to reject either classical real-
ism, or locality, or both. A number of authors, includ-
ing Bell himself (Bell, 1964, 2004), Bohm (1952), many
philosophers and commentators on quantum mechanics
(Albert, 1994; Greene, 2004; Maudlin, 2002) as well as
current researchers (see e.g. Ekert (1991); Gisin (2009)),
favor rejecting locality, but CQT most definitely opts for
retaining locality (EPR2) and rejecting classical realism
(EPR1), since the latter violates the single-framework
rule.
In our view the difference of opinion arises in part be-
cause of a confusion regarding the assumptions needed
to prove the Bell inequality. Although Bell (1964) ini-
tially presented the argument as simply drawing a fur-
ther conclusion from the two EPR assumptions, in later
presentations (see Bell (2004), p.232) he based the argu-
ment entirely on a condition he called “local causality”,
often referred to as “Bell locality” (Norsen, 2006). Its
mathematical expression is
Prob(A|B, a, b, λ) = Prob(A|a, λ), (11a)
Prob(B|A, a, b, λ) = Prob(B|b, λ), (11b)
Prob(A,B|a, b, λ) = Prob(A|B, a, b, λ)Prob(B|a, b, λ)
= Prob(A|a, λ)Prob(B|b, λ), (11c)
where Prob(C|D) = Prob(C,D)/Prob(D) is the condi-
tional probability of C given D and Prob(C,D) is the
joint probability of C and D. In Eqs.(11a-c) A and B
are measurement outcomes for measurements of types a
and b, respectively, on systems SA and SB, and λ de-
notes a set of additional variables that may be required
to specify fully the state of the joint systems. Although it
is not completely clear from the discussion in Bell (2004)
referred to above what precise assumptions went into the
justification of Eq.(11), Bell and his followers have con-
cluded from the violation of the Bell inequality that fol-
lows from (11) that it is the locality assumption that
is violated by quantum mechanics. On the other hand
many authors have over the years pointed out that local-
ity alone does not justify Eq. (11) or therefore the Bell
inequality [see e.g. Ballentine and Jarrett (1987) or more
recently Griffiths (2009) and Tresser (2010)]. In particu-
lar the existence of λ variables in Eq.(11) that fully spec-
ify the state of a physical system depends essentially on
some assumption additional to locality, which has been
variously named “predictive completeness”, “classical (or
weak) realism”, or “counterfactual definiteness”, as well
as other designations. According to these authors (and
to CQT) it is this additional assumption that is contra-
dicted by quantum mechanics, and referring to Eq.(11)
simply as a locality assumption is at best misleading.
Indeed, the violation of Eq. (11) by quantum mechan-
ics is due to the incompatibility between different local
choices for a, i.e. SAx or S
A
z (or different choices for b),
rather than any “spooky interaction” between the distant
spins SA and SB, so it is unrelated to the locality prop-
erty EPR2. In particular, Griffiths (2009) argues that
there are no quantum variables λ that satisfy Eq.(11)
if the different choices for a (or for b) do not commute.
What is at issue here is not the fact that Eq.(11) and
the Bell inequality that follows from it are violated by
quantum mechanics. The issue is to understand the ori-
gin of the violation and whether it is associated with a
failure of realism or completenes (EPR1), or of separa-
bility (EPR2). Needless to say, there is no consistent
framework for which Eq.(11) is satisfied.
The present author believes that had Einstein been
aware of Bell’s result, which follows from EPR1 and
EPR2, he too would have retained locality, since it is
so closely tied to the requirements of relativity, and he
would have had to reject classical realism. It is per-
haps permitted to fantasize that Einstein would have
embraced the quantum realism of CQT, as the best way
to reconcile quantum mechanics (whose predictions Ein-
stein did not doubt) with the requirements of locality.
According to CQT reality is relative to a framework just
as simultaneity is relative to a reference frame in special
relativity.
VIII. CONSISTENT HISTORIES
In order to provide a complete formulation of quan-
tum mechanics the foregoing notions must be general-
ized to consider systems with arbitrary numbers of de-
grees of freedom as well as their time dependence. This
generalization is the CQT formulated by Griffiths (1984)
and elaborated by others (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1993;
Omnes, 1999), as described in detail in the book by
Griffiths (2002). The general theory is still based on
the fundamental principle that what characterizes any
quantum system is the existence of multiple incompatible
frameworks, which are a generalization of the frameworks
defined above.
Let us first define a “history” as a set of “events” or
“properties”, represented by projection operators on the
Hilbert space at a sequence of times t1, ...tn. We then
consider a collection, or “family” of histories as a candi-
6date for a (consistent) framework. The probability of a
given history is calculated using a generalization of the
Born rule, as well as the dynamical properties of the sys-
tem, whose states evolve according to the Schroedinger
equation governed by the full Hamiltonian of the system
(see below). In contrast to the spin-½ case at a single
time, where frameworks were more or less automatically
consistent, it is in general necessary to impose stringent
consistency conditions in order for a given family of his-
tories to provide valid quantum predictions. The condi-
tions for a family to constitute a consistent framework
are:
(i) The sum of probabilities of the histories in
the family is unity;
(ii)Two distinct histories are mutually or-
thogonal, i.e. their product vanishes.
Each framework can again be described as an Exhaus-
tive Set of Exclusive Alternatives (ESEA), exhaustive
because of (i) and exclusive because of (ii), with a suit-
able definition of the product. Also, just as for spin-½,
frameworks cannot be combined, i.e. you obtain incor-
rect predictions if you take a subset of histories from one
framework (with probabilities adding up to p, say) and
combine them with another subset of histories from an-
other framework (with probabilities 1−p), in violation of
the single-framework rule. We shall use the terms family
and framework somewhat interchangeably, but in general
reserve the latter term for families whose histories satisfy
the consistency conditions. Another term for frameworks
is “realms” (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1993).
Specifically, let t0, t1, ..., tn be a discrete set of times
and let a “property” or “event” αj at time tj be defined
as a state or set of states in the Hilbert space of the
system under study, or as the projection operator P (αj)
onto that state or set of states, for which we shall use the
same notation. A “history” is then defined as a sequence
of projection operators whose tensor product is
C(α) = C(α0, α1, ..., αn)
= P (α0)⊙ P (α1)⊙ ...⊙ P (αn), (12)
where the notation ⊙ is designed to indicate that each
P (αk) acts in a copy of the system Hilbert space at time
tk, so that C(α) is an operator in the “history Hilbert
space” consisting of n replicas of the original Hilbert
space. In general the product of two histories must be
defined as an operation in this history Hilbert space (see
Ch.11 of Griffiths (2002)). If the system under study is
assumed to be in the pure state |ψ0〉 at time t0, however,
i.e. if the projector P (α0) is given by
P (α0) = |ψ0〉〈ψ0| ≡ [ψ0], (13)
then it is possible to define the product of two histories
in terms of “chain kets” in the original Hilbert space as
〈C(α), C(β)〉 = 〈α|β〉, (14)
where
|α〉 = Pˆ (αn)...Pˆ (α1)|ψ0〉, (15)
and Pˆ (αk) is a projection operator at time tk in the
Heisenberg representation. The probability of the his-
tory C(α) is then given by a generalization of the Born
rule
Prob[C(α)] = 〈C(α), C(α)〉 = 〈α|α〉. (16)
Let us now consider a set or family of histories
F({α}) = {C(α(1)), C(α(2)), ...C(α(m))}, (17)
where each of the C(α(k)) is a history, i.e. a product of
n projection operators as in Eq.(12). In order to be able
to assign probabilities in a consistent manner, the family
F({α}) must satisfy the following conditions:
m∑
k=1
C(α(k)) = Iij , (18)
where Iij is the n× n unit matrix in the history Hilbert
space and
〈C(α(k)), C(α(k′))〉 = 0, for k 6= k′, (19)
which expresses the orthogonality condition (ii). A fam-
ily of histories satisfying Eqs.(18) and (19) is called a
“consistent framework” (or framework for short). Equa-
tion(18) ensures that the framework is exhaustive and
Eq.(19) implies that the different histories are exclusive,
i.e. they do not “interfere”, thus permitting an interpre-
tation in terms of standard (Boolean) probabilities within
each framework.
The hallmark of a quantum, as opposed to a classical,
system is the existence of more than one (in fact an in-
finite number of) framework(s). Any statement about a
quantum system is expressed in the form
Prob[C(α(k))] = pk, (20)
i.e. the probability of the kth history in the framework
F({α}) is pk. Such statements refer to “real” histories of
the form (12), which consist of sequences of “real” prop-
erties, represented by projection operators onto states
|αj〉 of the system. The reality of these properties, how-
ever, is relative to a particular framework.
For illustration let us first consider once more the free
spin-½ discussed above. We denote the projector onto the
state |w+〉 at time tj by
P (|w+〉, tj) = [w+j ] = |w+(tj)〉〈w+(tj)|. (21)
A history with times t0, t1, ...tn will be written as
C = [u0]⊙ [v1]⊙ ...⊙ [wn], (22)
in the history Hilbert space, where [ui], [vj ], [wk] denote
projection operators onto states associated with various
7directions in 3-space at times ti, tj , tk, respectively, e.g.
[ui] = P (|u+〉, ti), using the same notation as in Eq.(13)
above.
It can be shown that any exhaustive family of two-
time histories automatically satisfies the consistency con-
ditions (18) and (19). For three-time histories, on the
other hand, the consistency conditions are not necessar-
ily satisfied. An example is the family consisting of the
histories
C(1) = [z+0 ]⊙ [x+1 ]⊙ [z+2 ], (23a)
C(2) = [z+0 ]⊙ [x+1 ]⊙ [z−2 ], (23b)
C(3) = [z+0 ]⊙ [x−1 ]⊙ [z+2 ], (23c)
C(4) = [z+0 ]⊙ [x−1 ]⊙ [z−2 ]. (23d)
The framework consisting of the histories in (23) can be
shown to be inconsistent since the histories C(1) and C(3)
[or C(2) and C(4)] are not mutually orthogonal, i.e. they
interfere. It is the presence of the final [z+2 ] operator in
Eqs.(23a) and (23c) that brings about the nonorthogo-
nality or interference between the histories C(1) and C(3).
If [z+2 ] is replaced by a unit operator, on the other hand,
then the histories C(1) and C(3) become orthogonal. An-
other way to make the framework (23) consistent is to
apply an appropriate magnetic field during the time in-
terval t0 < t < t2, in such a way that the history C
(2) be-
comes unitary and the histories C(1), C(3) and C(4) van-
ish. Alternatively, if we consider a free spin subject to a
measurement of Sx at t = t1, followed by a measurement
of Sz at t = t2, then the physical acts of measurement
allow one to define consistent histories with the expected
probabilities for experimental outcomes (Griffiths, 2002).
Thus the consistency of a framework is not a matter of
arbitrary choice or convention but instead it depends on
the forces and constraints applied to the system under
study.
Let us now consider briefly two entangled spins SA and
SB, represented by operators [z+Aj ], [z
+
Bj], etc. at times
tj . Let the initial state |ψ0〉 be the singlet
|ψ0〉 = (1/
√
2)(|z+A0〉|z−B0〉 − |z−A0〉|z+B0〉). (24)
Then we may define the two-time family consisting of
the histories
C(1) = [ψ0]⊙ [w+A1][v+B1], (25a)
C(2) = [ψ0]⊙ [w−A1][v+B1], (25b)
C(3) = [ψ0]⊙ [w+A1][v−B1], (25c)
C(4) = [ψ0]⊙ [w−A1][v−B1], (25d)
which may be shown to be consistent for arbitrary direc-
tions v and w.
Turning now to three-time histories we can consider
the consistent framework with a single history
C = [ψ0]⊙ [ψ1]⊙ [ψ2], (26)
whose probability is unity, where [ψj ] is the projector
onto the state |ψ0〉 advanced by the unitary Schroedinger
time dependence to the time tj . We refer to the family
(26) as the “unitary framework” (see Sec. IX below).
Another consistent framework splits the histories at t =
t1 and then continues unitarily to t = t2
C(1) = [ψ0]⊙ [z+A1][z−B1]⊙ [z+A2][z−B2], (27a)
C(2) = [ψ0]⊙ [z−A1][z+B1]⊙ [z−A2][z+B2], (27b)
to yield two histories each with probability ½. Alterna-
tively, the split could occur at t = t2, and by spherical
symmetry of |ψ0〉 the direction z in Eqs.(27) can be re-
placed by any other direction w. As an example of an
inconsistent family we show the set of 16 histories
[ψ0] ⊙ {[x+A1], [x−A1]}{[z+B1], [z−B1]}
⊙ {[z+A2], [z−A2]}{[x+B2], [x−B2]}, (28)
where the notation {C,D}{E,F} denotes the four prod-
ucts CE,DE,CF,DF . It can then be verified that the
family (28) is inconsistent since there are four histories
ending in [z−A2][x
−
B2] and these are not mutually orthog-
onal.
Finally, it should be noted for clarity that the histories
of CQT are different from the histories in Feynman’s path
integral (sum over histories) formulation of the solution of
the Schroedinger equation (Feynman and Hibbs, 1965).
In the Feynman case the histories are associated with
complex amplitudes so they interfere with one another,
whereas the histories of CQT are mutually exclusive and
only appear in terms of their (real) probabilities in any
physical predictions. The mysterious physics of quantum
superpositions is fully captured in CQT by the existence
of multiple incompatible frameworks, each one of which
is in a sense classical (Boolean), not by interference of
histories or any other ’superposition’.
The above brief description of CQT is intended as an
informal summary of its main qualitative features. A
more detailed description can be found in the book by
Griffiths (2002) and references therein. In particular Ch.
23 provides a detailed illustration of the different frame-
works associated with singlet state correlations of two
spins.
IX. THE UNITARY FRAMEWORK AND THE
COLLAPSE FRAMEWORK
In the language of CQT one can define the so-called
unitary framework, which in one guise or another is im-
plicit in many discussions of quantum mechanics. We
consider an arbitrary system with initial state |ψ0〉 at
t = t0, and let it evolve deterministically according to
the Schroedinger equation with some given Hamiltonian.
We denote by |ψn〉 this exact state at time t = tn. Then
the unitary framework consists of the single history
[ψ0]⊙ [ψ1]⊙ ...⊙ [ψn], (29)
8whose probability is unity. This is a valid prediction
of quantum mechanics, but unless the final state is the
eigenstate of some straightforward observable it is also
not a particularly useful prediction, since it contains no
accessible physical information. In particular the values
of any observables are in general undefined in this frame-
work.
There is, however, a framework that is close to the
unitary one, which we can call the “collapse framework”,
which is the one employed in the orthodox formulation
of quantum mechanics. It consists of the histories enu-
merated by the index k,
CAk = [ψ0]⊙ [ψ1]⊙ ...⊙ [ψn−1]⊙ [Akn], (30)
where [Akn] is the projector onto the k
th eigenfunction
of the operator A at time tn, with eigenvalue ak and A
is some observable. Since the eigenfunctions of A form
an orthonormal basis, the family CAk is an appropriate
consistent framework. If the Hamiltonian of the system
is such that a measurement of A is carried out at the
time tn, then this framework embodies the orthodox no-
tion that in all histories the system is described by |ψ(t)〉
from t = t0 to t = tn−1, and that the system then “di-
vides” into the different eigenfunctions of A when a mea-
surement of A is made at t = tn. In CQT this collapse
framework is one valid representation of the system, but
by no means the only one and it does not signify that
any physical collapse has taken place.
X. QUANTUM PARADOXES
CQT, as the name indicates, is designed to provide a
consistent account of the predictions of quantum mechan-
ics, grounded in a realistic view of the microscopic world,
that recognizes the profoundly counter-intuitive nature of
complementarity but defines its consequences precisely.
The theory thus contains no paradoxes, so it must in
some way “explain” the well-known quantum paradoxes
that have been the subject of so much discussion in the
literature. Generally speaking, each paradox can be seen,
from the point of view of CQT, as a more or less subtle
violation of the single-framework rule, as explained in
detail in Chapters 20-25 of the book by Griffiths (2002).
We have already indicated how this occurs for the EPR
and Bell “paradoxes”, and we shall confine our further
remarks to a brief discussion of the Schroedinger Cat
paradox, since it has been cited by Leggett (2002, 2005)
as the most important problem with orthodox quantum
mechanics.
The Schroedinger Cat paradox can be thought to arise
because one is implicitly thinking in terms of the unitary
framework, and at the same time thinking of the system
as containing a superposition of live and dead cats. Ac-
cording to CQT, however, there are no cats at all in the
unitary framework and in the cat-framework there are
no superpositions. The simple analogue for the spin-½
system in the state |z+〉 is to say “I will accept a super-
position of |x+〉 and |x−〉 for microscopic states, since we
know from experience that the microworld is weird, but
for macroscopic (cat) states, that is impossible”. The an-
swer from CQT is that in neither case (micro or macro)
is the “superposition” a valid quantum mechanical de-
scription. In the z-framework neither |x+〉 nor |x−〉 is
defined (no cats) and in the x-framework we have either
〈Sx〉 = ½ (live cat) or 〈Sx〉 = −½ (dead cat), each with
probability ½. For the macroscopic case the analogue of
the z-framework is the unitary framework and it has no
simple physical interpretation, and certainly no cats. The
analogue of the x-framework is the set of (Boolean) al-
ternatives -live cat or dead cat -, with appropriate prob-
abilities for each.
XI. DECOHERENCE AND THE CLASSICAL LIMIT
The effects of a random environment on physical sys-
tems and measurement instruments, termed decoherence
(Zeh, 1970; Zurek, 2003), are often cited as explaining
how one passes from the microscopic to the macroscopic
and thus how the collapse invoked in the orthodox formu-
lation of quantum mechanics is to be interpreted. Deco-
herence is also invoked to understand the “measurement
problem” and the classical limit of quantum mechanics.
From this point of view there is nothing special about
measurements: they are a particular type of physical in-
teraction that needs to be explained by the theory, rather
than being an irreducible part of its formulation as in the
orthodox or Copenhagen viewpoints.
It has been pointed out, however, that although deco-
herence does make plausible the passage from quantum
to classical domains, when it is applied to the full quan-
tum mechanical wave function as a representation of the
state of the system, it still does not by itself remove the
measurement problem or the paradox of Schroedinger’s
Cat (Adler, 2003; Leggett, 2002).
CQT agrees with the above statements since, as stated
previously, it attaches no special significance to macro-
scopic measurements. Moreover, the theory recognizes
that decoherence applied in the unitary framework does
indeed not resolve the paradox of Schroedinger’s Cat
or the measurement problem. The relevant question,
however, is “what is the effect of decoherence not on
wavefunctions but on histories, in the different frame-
works?” Although the answer has not been fully worked
out, the problem has been extensively studied, primarily
by Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993), and by Omnes (1999)
and the overall picture is the following (see also Ch 26 of
Griffiths (2002)).
Decoherence in general destroys interference effects
and it can thus render certain families of histories (frame-
works) consistent, when in the absence of decoherence
they would be inconsistent. It can then be argued, and
shown in detail for simple models, that a large class of
ensuing coarse-grained histories (as opposed to wavefunc-
9tions), are close to the corresponding classical trajectories
for the system and that the corresponding probabilities
are close to unity, thus justifying the determinism of clas-
sical mechanics as emerging from quantum mechanics.
This does not mean that all frameworks are transformed
into sets of quasiclassical orbits, for example the unitary
framework certainly is not, but the latter also does not in
general provide a useful set of predictions. The general
situation appears to be that in the classical limit, frame-
works are either inconsistent (thus meaningless), uninfor-
mative (e.g. the unitary framework), or they approach
classical behavior.
In this way CQT naturally leads to the emergence of
quasiclassical frameworks on the coarse-grained scale of
macroscopic phenomena, coexisting with a multiplicity
of incompatible but individually consistent frameworks
on the microscopic scale. As noted, such a division be-
tween the classical and quantum domains was a starting
assumption of the orthodox and Copenhagen formula-
tions. Note that decoherent histories are a special, albeit
important, example of consistent histories, but the phys-
ical phenomenon of decoherence is not necessary in order
to formulate the theory, for example it is not involved in
our description of the single spin-½ system in Sec. II, so
Griffiths’s consistency conditions represent a more gen-
eral formulation of the approach.
XII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It appears that the main philosophical difference be-
tween CQT and most other formulations of quantum
mechanics lies in the role ascribed to the wavefunction.
Since the wavefunction encodes all the information about
a system it is natural to interpret it to “represent” the
system, just as the phase space point and its orbit rep-
resent a classical system. It was recognized early on by
Bohr and his colleagues, however, that the wavefunction
could not provide a realistic representation of a quantum
system, isolated from observation, i.e. from some mea-
surement apparatus. This idea was made precise by EPR,
who concluded that the wavefunction does not provide
a “complete description” of a quantum system. Bohm
(1952) and Bell (1964) then showed that if one insists
on a (classically) realistic representation, it follows that
quantum systems will inevitably display nonlocal influ-
ences that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of relativity.
In its most extreme form the insistence that the wave
function provide a complete representation of quantum
reality leads to the “relative state” or “many worlds”
theory of Everett (1957). The dizzying complexity of
even the simplest systems in this theory seems to the
present author to provide ample motivation for seeking
a different formulation.
CQT, on the other hand, retains the requirement of
realism, but it abandons the notion that it is the wave
function that “represents” the system under study, sub-
stituting instead histories, provided these are part of a
consistent framework. All of the difficulties encountered
by previous formulations and interpretations (the para-
doxes and the weirdness) are encapsulated (not elimi-
nated!) in the notion that quantum systems necessar-
ily possess multiple incompatible frameworks. Once this
notion has been accepted (“digested” might be a better
term) the theory unfolds in a logical manner without fur-
ther paradoxes or mysteries. In CQT the wavefunction
is by no means unimportant, since as mentioned above
it encodes all the dynamical information about a system
and it is thus essential for calculating any meaningful
properties, but it does not provide a direct universal rep-
resentation of quantum reality. It is true, of course, that
in the unitary framework described in Sec. IX the wave
function constitutes a valid history, but that history is in
general not useful for answering physical questions about
the system.
In a sense, CQT can be considered to vindicate EPR in
that it confirms the statement that the wavefunction does
not provide a complete representation (“description”) of
physical reality. CQT also follows EPR in seeking a real-
istic formulation of quantum mechanics, but it replaces
the classical realism of EPR1 by the quantum realism of
multiple coexisting but incompatible frameworks. In that
sense CQT reconciles Einstein and Bohr, but without the
latter’s resort to measurement and classical apparatus in
the definition of quantum reality.
It may also be argued that CQT satisfies the require-
ments put forth by Bell (1990) in his criticism of the or-
thodox and Copenhagen viewpoints. CQT is not based
on measurement, it does not require an artificial sepa-
ration (a “cut”) between the classical and quantum do-
mains and it needs no “interpretation”, since the theory
is defined by the equations themselves.
We have already discussed the sense in which the vi-
olation of the Bell inequality, which results from the
violation of Eq.(11), should be interpreted as negating
classical realism rather than locality. As emphasized by
Griffiths (2009), quantum mechanics certainly has non-
local states and frameworks, but then so does classical
mechanics, for example a plane wave state is surely non-
local. What does not occur in quantum mechanics, any
more than in classical mechanics, is true nonlocality in
the sense of nonlocal influence of one localized subsystem
on another remote localized subsystem. This is why the
pervasive use of the term “nonlocal” to describe quan-
tum mechanics and particularly the violation of Eq.(11),
seems to us to be maximally misleading.
Let us comment briefly on the concept of “entangle-
ment”, which is cited by many authors as the signature
property of quantum systems that illustrates its funda-
mental nonlocal character. From the point of view of
CQT, entanglement is a description of how properties
contained in framework F appear in the language of
framework G. The phenomenon is particularly striking
when properties referring to two widely separated sub-
systems factorize in framework F , while those same two
subsystems contribute to a single property in framework
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G. An example is the EPR pair considered in Eq.(24)
above, for which one can calculate the probability that
spins A and B have a relative angle θ using the framework
(25), whereas these properties are fully entangled and
thus undefined in the unitary framework based on (24).
Similarly, in a two-slit experiment the framework dis-
playing the interference pattern does not contain states
in which the particle goes through either slit, since these
are entangled in that framework. Strictly speaking, CQT
does away with entanglement and replaces it with incom-
patible frameworks, i.e. the knowledge that even though
a framework is exhaustive it is not “complete”, since it
allows for the existence of other frameworks.
Quantum reality can be succinctly defined as “any
property or set of properties of a system for which quan-
tum mechanics can calculate a probability”. Note that
quantum mechanics does not answer the question “which
real property or event actually occurs?” That question
can be considered “excess baggage” (Hartle, 2007). A
further essential insight of CQT is that probabilities can
only be defined if a suitable sample space has been spec-
ified, and quantum systems are characterized by a mul-
tiplicity of overlapping and incompatible sample spaces,
called frameworks. Any statement about quantum real-
ity must specify the framework (or set of frameworks) to
which it applies.
We conclude by quoting Richard Feynman
(Feynman et al., 2006):
In this chapter we shall tackle immediately
the basic element of the mysterious behav-
ior in its most strange form. We choose to
examine a phenomenon [two-slit interference]
which is impossible, absolutely impossible, to
explain in any classical way, and which has in
it the heart of quantum mechanics. In real-
ity, it contains the only mystery. We cannot
make the mystery go away by “explaining”
how it works. We will just tell you how it
works. In telling you how it works we will
have told you about the basic peculiarities of
all quantum mechanics.
Feynman’s point of view is very much in line with that
of CQT, in particular the statement that the only mys-
tery of quantum mechanics can be fully displayed using
the example of a single electron in a two-slit interfer-
ence experiment, which displays the wave-particle du-
ality. Note in particular the absence of any reference
to entanglement of distant particles or to nonlocality of
quantum behavior.
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